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THE LEARNING YEARS: A REVIEW OF THE 
CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF 
ADOLESCENCE 
By Bruce C. Hafen* 
THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE. By Franklin E. 
Zimring. New York: The Free Press. 1982. Pp. xvi, 208. $14.95. 
Contemporary egalitarianism seeks identical legal treatment for all per-
sons. Thus it rejects not only distinctions based on race or gender, but also 
those based on age, competence, or marital status. The traditional concept 
of minority status challenges this logic by assuming that discriminatory 
classifications (in this case, classifications based on age) can provide the 
subjects of wise discrimination with needed protection and, over time, more 
meaningful individual liberty. 
During the years of infancy and early childhood, the absence of even 
minimal capacity for self-governance makes obvious the need for special 
legal treatment. Adolescence, however, is another matter. Most adoles-
cents appear physically able to act autonomously and to live with the conse-
quences of their actions, even when their choices are unwise and the 
consequences disastrous, for others as well as for themselves. What right, 
then, allows parents or society to restrict the autonomy of adolescents? In 
his new book, Professor Frank Zimring argues for legal "semi-autonomy" 
for adolescents on the grounds that theirs is a "learner's permit" stage of 
life, requiring more freedom than young children enjoy, but more restric-
tions than are placed on adults. This combination is said to be necessary to 
optimize the likelihood of mature individual development. Zimring's argu-
ment rejects the logic of extreme egalitarianism by favoring the preserva-
tion of discriminations based on age, or, more precisely, on the 
developmental processes related to age. 
Zimring's contribution is timely, because it adds a voice of clarity, com-
mon sense, and reason to a climate of increasing confusion about the legal 
and political status as well as the psychological needs and social identity of 
adolescents. The existing legal uncertainties have been profoundly affected 
by large scale forces both within and beyond the disciplines of the law over 
several decades: the automobile, massive public education, urbanization, 
increased economic dependency, television, and peer pressure. Any one of 
these or several other factors deserves far more attention than Zimring's 
short volume can give if the contemporary context of the children's rights 
movement is to be understood. Neil Postman believes, for instance, that 
television alone is causing "the disappearance of childhood,"1 because TV 
* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University (on leave as President of Ricks College). 
-Ed. 
l. N. POSTMAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CHILDHOOD (1982). 
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requires no instruction for viewers to grasp its form and because it makes 
no attempt to age-segregate its audience - as have other forms of mass 
communication. As society has mirrored the overwhelming influence of tel-
evision, the behavior patterns, attitudes, expectations, and even physical ap-
pearance of adults and children have become increasingly similar. Also on 
a broad scale, Barbara Tuchman has observed a pervasive loss of confi-
dence in human judgment in Western society through the wrenching exper-
iences of this century, one result of which is "a widespread and eroding 
reluctance to take any stand on any values, moral, behavioral, or aes-
thetic."2 For the young, this means a frustrating absence of both structure 
and purpose in the intellectual and social environment. 
More within the domain of the law, some have seen the children's rights 
movement as a logical corollary of the civil rights movement and the wo-
men's movement: "[T]he arguments for and against perpetuation of [minor-
ity] status have a familiar ring. In good measure they are the same 
arguments that were advanced over the issues of slavery and the emancipa-
tion of married women."3 Some of the constitutional doctrines that 
emerged in the judicial response to these movements have been applied in 
the children's rights cases. These applications also reflect a more general 
tendency toward the constitutionalization of family law. When one's favor-
ite tool becomes a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. Actually, the 
American legal system has long since enforced the legal "right" of children 
(albeit, not always a "constitutional" right) to be protected against abuse, 
neglect, and abandonment. In addition, such affirmative children's rights 
as educational opportunity and parental care have been forcefully recog-
nized and impressively funded over many years. The introduction of con-
stitutional analysis to problems involving children has therefore added little 
to the substantive legal foundation and may, in fact, have caused enough 
confusion about the entire notion of minority status to have more than off-
set any accompanying gains.4 The contemporary mood nevertheless re-
mains skeptical about both the purpose and the validity of legal 
classifications or apparent restrictions on liberty that are based on some 
group's alleged need for benign government protection. We are increas-
ingly unwilling to believe that anyone's best interest could truly be ad-
vanced by limiting his freedom. 
It is especially interesting to welcome to this scene the perspective of a 
University of Chicago law professor whose primary work has been in em-
pirically oriented criminal law studies. In that field, Professor Zimring has 
seen the effect of egalitarian thinking on the treatment of juvenile offenders 
and has been disturbed by it. Despite his concurrence with much of the 
recent criticism of the juvenile court system (some evidence for which is in 
the present volume), Zimring has felt that proposals to treat older juvenile 
2. Tuchman, The Missing Element: Moral Courage, in IN SEARCH OF LEADERS 3 (1967), 
3. Foster & Freed,A Bill of Rights far Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343 (1972). Accord Wald, 
Making Sense Out of the Rights of Youth, 4 HUM. RTS. 13, IS (1974) ("The child's subjugated 
status was rooted in the same benevolent despotism that kings, husbands, and slave masters 
claimed as their moral right."). 
4. See generally Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reserva-
tions About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (examines risks 
involved in uncritical application of egalitarian concepts to unique context of children). 
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offenders as adults for penal law purposes may produce "harsh and arbi-
trary" policies.5 He has believed that separate treatment for adolescent of-
fenders is justified by their diminished responsibility for their actions and 
by the need to provide them an "opportunity . . . to outgrow a develop-
mental stage that is peculiarly vulnerable to pressures toward criminality."6 
Here is the germ of the "learners permit" concept, which is applied in this 
book to a range of adolescent law problems much broader than criminal 
law. 
I. APPROACH AND STYLE 
The Changing Legal World of Adolescence is based on the Thomas Coo-
ley lectures delivered at the University of Michigan Law School in the Fall 
of 1980. The content had been developed while Zimring was a fellow the 
previous year at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sci-
ences at Palo Alto, California. Because of the lecture format and Zimring's 
chatty style, the book is neither technically difficult nor heavily docu-
mented. Zimring is certainly capable of a more academic approach, but 
chose to reject an "elephantine volume" (p. 161) in favor of accessibility by 
a wider audience. This makes for refreshing reading since, in the words of 
Francis Allen, (who, by the way, inspired Zimring to undertake this pro-
ject), "[n]ever has ... reasonable brevity and the informal style been more 
needed" in writing by legal academics than "at this hour."7 Predictably, of 
course, this approach requires the serious reader to look to other sources for 
a more comprehensive and fully documented treatment of the law of 
adolescence. 8 
There is some risk that this book may be something of a stylistic adoles-
cent itself - it asks a little too much of the lay reader while being insuffi-
ciently developed to persuade the legal scholar (though surely it will 
stimulate the scholar). For example, the entire text of one recent, long 
Supreme Court opinion is included as an appendix, "[f]or those who will 
use this volume as an introduction to legal studies" (p. 161). But one case 
can only be illustrative, and little direction is given on how to relate this 
case to the line of cases of which it is a part. The case seems to be some-
thing of an afterthought, leaving me unsure just how a high school or col-
lege instructor might be expected to use the book as a text. It could provide 
material for some provocative and worthwhile classroom work, but proba-
bly requires a teacher having additional background and source material. 
At the opposite extreme, Professor Zimring suggests at several points 
that the book is 'Jurisprudence": "[t]his book attempts to apply a realist 
jurisprudential method to the problems of law and the young" (p. xiii). 
One of the book's major sections is entitled ''The Jurisprudence of Semi-
Autonomy," and elsewhere he refers to a 'Jurisprudence of adolescence" (p. 
126). Near the conclusion, Zimring writes that the "rigorous brand of mud-
5. Zimring, Pursuing Juvenile Justice: Comments on Some Recent Reform Proposals, 55 U. 
DET. J. URB, L. 631, 645 (1978). 
6. Id. at 642. 
7. Allen, In Praise of Book Reviews, 79 MICH. L. REV. 557, 559 (1981). 
8. See, e.g., R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE (1978). 
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dling through" he has just described in one extended illustration "is not 
merely the stuff of the legal world of adolescence; it should be the essence of 
twentieth century legal method" (p. 159). The book does proceed from the 
assumption that workable policy analysis must consider empirically de-
monstrable costs and benefits; it also conveys a healthy skepticism about the 
value of abstract formalism, whether as constitutional rules or otherwise. 
Thus it has the flavor of a typical contemporary law school classroom, 
where legal realism in the broad sense is so pervasive that we seldom call it 
jurisprudence. But the book's limited scope allows for little explication of 
the premises of legal realism as jurisprudence. My point is simply that it 
may be unrealistic to expect a book of this size and style to appeal equally 
across a spectrum of readers stretching from high school students to schol-
ars of jurisprudence. Even as I say that, however, I must observe that Zimr-
ing's insight, straightforward style, and (usually) uncomplicated language 
make his work valuable at several levels of sophistication. If the book is a 
stylistic adolescent, it is a precocious one. 
II. LEGAL LITERATURE CONTEXT 
A. Categories of Children's "Rights" 
There are several ways to categorize the contemporary issues and litera-
ture on children's rights, each of which helps give perspective to this book's 
place in the literature. Michael Wald has suggested four categories to de-
scribe the range of issues involved: (1) rights "against the world" to ade-
quate health and physical care; (2) rights to protection from harm or 
inadequate care from parents or others; (3) rights to state policies granting 
adult legal status; and (4) rights to act independently of parents prior to 
emancipation.9 Zimring deals mostly with the last two of these categories, 
and then only as they apply to adolescents. He is generally sympathetic to 
reducing state control over the "liberty" interests of adolescents, but would 
maintain their nonadult status in applying criminal laws or rights to 
parental financial support. He does not generally favor legal support for 
independent action as against parents. 
I have attempted elsewhere10 to suggest a slightly different form of cate-
gorization by distinguishing between rights of "protection" and rights of 
"choice." Rights of protection include such legal claims as interests in 
property, rights to physical protection, and procedural due process rights. 
Most of the legal doctrines developed to date for the benefit of minors in 
both the constitutional and juvenile law context are of this type. Protection 
rights are available to children, as they are to legally incompetent adults, 
regardless of age or capacity for autonomous action. "Choice rights," on 
the other hand, presuppose a basic capacity for responsible action. Thus, 
age limitations on the right to vote, the right to marry without parental 
consent, or the right to make a binding contract prevent the exercise of a 
minor's choice right on the assumption that persons below the specified age 
lack the capacity for meaningful choice. In a sense, limitations on choice 
rights represent a form of protection for minors, because they protect mi-
9. Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework far Analysis, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 255,260 (1979), 
10. See Hafen, supra note 4, at 644-50. 
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nors against their own immaturity and against their vulnerability to ex-
ploitation by others. In drawing this distinction, I was cautioning those 
who assume that legal ( especially constitutional) recognition of protection 
rights logically implies the extension of choice rights. 
Frank Zimring's exclusive focus on the adolescent minor directs his at-
tention largely toward choice rights, since adolescents are the only minors 
who, as a practical matter, have arguable de facto choicemaking capacity. 
He also stresses the need to protect adolescents against the full conse-
quences of their own improvident choices as well as from the abuses of 
excessive judicial or other official discretion. He shares my concern about 
the indiscriminate assumption that recognition of protection rights implies 
recognition of choice rights. Consider, for example, his view of Carey v. 
Population Services International, 11 in which the Supreme Court invali-
dated - in the name of the right of privacy - a state law preventing per-
sons under age 16 from obtaining contraceptives: 
The sexually active 15-year-old is given access to birth control not out of 
recognition of his or her mature judgment. Indeed, the less equipped a 
particular individual is for the burdens of parenthood, the stronger the ar-
gument against denying access to contraception when we cannot deny ac-
cess to sex. But the "right" in this case is not a right to vaginal foam. The 
civil right being vindicated is the right not to be gratuitously harmed. [P. 
63.] 
Carey launches Zimring into discussing one of his major points - that state 
policies should "avoid harming kids in the name of helping them" (p. 62). 
As his view of Carey implies, to ensure this kind of "protection right" may 
erroneously appear to acknowledge a "choice right" which could establish 
precedents requiring the extension of further decisionmaking rights. Zimr-
ing clearly accepts the distinction between choice rights and protection 
rights, and warns against blurring the distinction: 
[T]he language of unqualified rights invites a form of reasoning by analogy 
that is particularly confusing. Many are tempted to generalize the "right" 
to contraceptives, treatment for venereal disease, and treatment for alcohol 
and drug abuse to the "right of a minor to make independent choices about 
medical treatment." This is a regrettable and avoidable error. 
"Privacy'' legislation dealing with venereal disease and drug and alco-
hol abuse is really state guidance of adolescents rather than any recogni-
tion of autonomy. In public policy terms, there is only one right answer to 
the question of whether alcoholism, drug misuse, or venereal disease 
should be treated rather than ignored. [P. 64.] 
B. "Who Gets To Decide" Categories 
Robert Mnookin has advanced a broad perspective on the range of chil-
dren's rights issues by suggesting that the real policy question underlying 
most of the problems is "who gets to decide" what should happen to a 
child's legally protectable interest. 12 The three possible candidates for that 
role are agents of the state, the child himself, or the parents. 
l 1. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
12. See Lecture at Family Law Symposium, Brigham Young University Law School (Jan. 
30, 1981). 
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The "child saver" movement that so heavily influenced the development 
of the juvenile court and public education systems during the past century 
assigned a high priority to the role of state agents in directing the lives of 
children of all ages. Zimring concurs in what has become a widespread 
criticism of this movement. He is charitable enough to acknowledge that 
the leaders of the child saver movement "were not unmindful of the values 
of youth autonomy" (p. 37), even though the evidence now suggests that 
state power has often been used to pursue "punitive as well as protective 
agendas" (p. 36). Zimring's general observation, however, is that social de-
velopments affecting American adolescents simply outpaced the adaptabil-
ity of youth welfare institutions: "While the legal theory of youthful 
dependency stood still, the essential elements of modern adolescence fell 
into place: prolonged economic dependence, age segregation, and tremen-
dous physical mobility" (p. 45). Thus, both the recent criticisms of those 
institutions and the· resulting changes in legal policy "were reactions to 
changes in social reality that had been in process for some time," as the law 
has "attempted to catch up with the world" (p. 45). Rather than saying the 
child saver theory was always wrong, he seems to be saying that the theory 
has been inadequate to deal with the broad scale social changes that have 
created today's "adolescent society." 
In addition, Professor Zimring is skeptical about governmental inter-
vention in the lives of children because of his preference for "parental au-
thority and family privacy" (p. 53), a preference substantially affected by 
"how little government knows about what is correct for particular children" 
(p. 54). While Zimring's focus on older children steers him away from con-
sideration of when state intervention is justified to prevent abuse or neglect, 
the reader can sense in the book's general tone that his skepticism about 
state influence does not reach the extreme anti-state position represented by 
the work of Goldstein, Freund, and Solnit on family intervention. 13 
2. Children's Liberators 
The second candidate for the leading role in determining the child's le-
gal interests is, of course, the child himself. Perhaps the most extreme reac-
tion against the child savers' view that children are totally dependent has 
been the children's liberation movement. This school of thought is opposed 
not only to state control, but to parental control as well. It assumes that 
each child should direct the course of his own life and, toward that end, 
should be guaranteed the full range of adult legal rights, from the right to 
vote to the rights to contract and marry. 14 The association of this move-
13. See Wald, Thinking About Public Policy Toward Abuse and Neglect of Children (Book 
Review), 78 MICH. L. REV. 645 (1980) (reviewing J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUND & A. SoLNIT, 
BEFORE THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD (1979)). 
14. Some of the relevant literature is summarized in Hafen, supra note 4, at 632 n.98, See 
also the proposal of James Manahan, chairman of the American Bar Association's Section of 
Individual Rights and Responsibilities: "I propose that we consider the logical and ultimate 
step that all legal distinctions between children and adults be abolished." Editorial, Section of 
Individual Rights and Responsibilities Newsletter, Spring 1976. 
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ment with other liberation movements 15 has given it a decidedly philosoph-
ical rather than empirical thrust. Some of its ardent advocates make no 
claim that children's liberation demonstrably serves the "best interests" of 
children. On the contrary: 
[A]sking what is good for children is beside the point. We will grant chil-
dren rights . . . not because we are sure that childreµ will then become 
better people, but . . . because we believe that expanding freedom as a 
way of life is worthwhile in itself. 16 
No court or legislature has taken this position seriously enough to adopt 
it as a general policy goal, presumably because of the obvious incapacity of 
infants and young children. Adolescents, of course, are something else, not 
only because they have some fully developed physical capacities, but also 
because they typically emit such strong personal signals that cry out for 
independence and autonomy. The U.S. Supreme Court has struggled to 
develop a coherent position on adolescent autonomy, primarily in the con-
text of abortions for unmarried minor young women. The most lucid state-
ment developed to date is the plurality opinion of Mr. Justice Powell in 
Bellotti v. Baird II. 17 Powell reasoned that "[t]he peculiar vulnerability of 
children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature 
manner; and the importance of the parental role in child-rearing" together 
justify "the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be 
equated with those of adults." 18 Despite this general perspective, Powell 
and the Court declared unconstitutional state laws requiring "mature" mi-
nors to obtain parental consent for an abortion. Curiously, the Court fell 
back on child-saver assumptions by leaving the entirely subjective determi-
nation of "maturity" in the hands of judges and by directing that judges 
determine whether an abortion is in the best interest of a minor found to be 
immature. With minors' abortions, we have the proverbial bad lawmaking 
of hard cases at its worst. 19 I have argued elsewhere20 that the minors' 
abortion decisions are an exceptional class of cases and that the Supreme 
Court's children's rights cases in the aggregate do not add up to a children's 
liberation policy on choice rights. Nevertheless, some lower courts have 
interpreted the Supreme Court's position as establishing a constitutionally 
15. See text accompanying note 3 supra. 
16. R. FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS 31 (1974). 
17. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
18. 443 U.S. at 634. 
19. As Zimring observes: 
If contraception is a hard case, teen-age abortion may be an impossible problem .... 
When teen-age pregnancy occurs, it is an emergency that is biologically unpostponable. 
Parental consultation may carry enormous cost and the question of whether an abortion is 
in an adolescent girl's best interests is more properly asked of a theologian than of a 
parent or a juvenile court judge .... Requiring parental consultation may in some cases 
result in the adolescent girl's learning that she has parental support for alternatives she 
might prefer to abortion ff she knew her parents approved. In other cases, parental rage 
will be added to an already formidable list of impediments pregnant teenagers face .... 
[O]ne cannot decide what side to take in this debate by declaring a bias in favor of youth 
welfare. 
Pp. 66-67 (emphasis in original). 
20. Hafen, The Conslilulional Sia/us of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy- Balancing 
the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 511-16 (1983). 
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protected presumption against any state enforced restrictions on minors' 
autonomy.21 
In this context, Professor Zimring offers one of his major contributions. 
On the one hand, he persuasively argues that it is both unfair and unrealis-
tic to bar adolescents' freedom to make important choices - in part be-
cause they really do have greater capacity than younger children, and in 
part because they genuinely need a meaningful chance to learn how to 
make decisions by making some. "Being mature takes practice. To know 
this is to suppose [one] justification for extending privileges in public law 
and family life to those who have not yet reached full maturity" (p. 89). On 
the other hand, Zimring is equally persuasive in arguing that today's ado-
lescents are not really adults, and are entitled to be protected from the 
harmful consequences of premature total "liberation," again in the interest 
of their developing maturity. Zimring thus rejects the linkage between 
"kids' lib" and other current movements: "In caricature, this perspective is 
the bedtime story of the 1990's: first there was black liberation, then there 
was women's liberation, then there was children's liberation" (p. 23). He 
sees "equality in the eyes of the law" (p. 24) as the goal of both the Civil 
Rights and Women's Rights movements, and therefore finds that "the anal-
ogy between these movements and the changing legal world of adolescence 
is incomplete. The only way to construct a jurisprudence of equality in 
adolescence is to rob the adolescent years of any special legal mean-
ing. . . . The costs and benefits of American adolescence deserve their 
own special consideration" (p. 25). There is, for the adolescent, "benefit in 
a special, legally protected growing period that is a transition to a fully 
realized adult status" (p. 26). He notes further that limitations on individ-
ual liberty during such a period ''will be outgrown" - "[b]arring reincarna-
tion" (p. 27), which also distinguishes adolescents' legal restrictions from 
restrictions based on race or gender. 
By seeing adolescents as in a class by themselves, Zimring helps solve 
the problem legislators, judges, and scholars face in taking a position on 
children's liberty issues. If instead of two stages there are three recognized 
legal stages (child, adolescent, and adult), we are not forced to violate com-
mon sense in either direction - by lumping teenagers with infants or with 
adults. "[T]he theory that those who are not totally independent should be 
regarded as totally dependent is the most troublesome aspect of the legal 
theory of early adolescence associated with juvenile courts, public schools, 
and social services for most of this century" (pp. 27-28). Zimring also clari-
fies the debate with his insight that the purpose of extending "semi-auton-
omy" to adolescents is to give them carefully selected experience from 
which they can learn to assume adult responsibility with minimal risk of 
permanent damage. Such a guiding purpose for grants oflegal autonomy is 
unique, but it is a sufficiently understandable purpose that it can give policy 
guidance that has too often been overlooked as we have taken sides either 
for or against unlimited children's liberation. Young people must learn 
from their own experience, including negative experience: 
21. E.g., Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980) ("signifi-
cant state interest" must be demonstrated to warrant restriction on minors' liberty interests in 
free association). 
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We want adolescents to make mistakes, but we hope they make the right 
kinds of mistakes .... [Thus, youth policies should minimize] the harm 
young persons do themselves, and [keep] to a minimum the harm we inflict 
on them when they have abused opportunities in ways that harm the com-
munity. Above almost all else, we seek a legal policy that preserves the life 
chances for those who make serious mistakes, as well as preserving choices 
for their more fortunate (and more virtuous) contemporaries. [Pp. 91-92.] 
3. Parents 
Zimring is, then, neither a child saver, who would prefer the influence of 
state agents, nor is he a pure child liberationist, who would always opt for 
autonomous self-governance by the child. He would of course allow con-
siderable individual liberty to adolescent minors when their legally pro-
tected choice rights meet the "educational" criteria just mentioned. 
However, his overall position more closely favors the third candidate for 
having general responsibility for adolescent choices - the parents. Toward 
that end, Zimring advocates a "rebuttable presumption of family liberty" 
{also called "the presumption of parental liberty" at p. 85) (emphasis ad-
ded), which generally leaves to the parents of an adolescent the task of 
guiding "the transition from family authority to adult-style liberty" (p. 118). 
Were that presumption in place, courts or legislators would "ask, as a pre-
condition to assuming power over parents or children, whether there is any 
good reason why such power should not reside in the private sector" (p. 52). 
He defends this policy premise by citing the value of "parental authority 
and family privacy," even while recognizing that "increasing family author-
ity may reduce the freedom of choice of the individual adolescent" (p. 53). 
The presumption is justified in part because of his "skeptical view of the 
efficacy and legitimacy of public officials second-guessing parents on ques-
tions of child welfare" (p. 54). Further, he would not allow children to 
bring governmental power to bear in resolving differences with their par-
ents, because such recourse would "intensify the regulatory relationship be-
tween government and family" (p. 53). Thus, he would "keep the 
government's nose out of parent-child disputes in almost all cases" (p. 57). 
Some family law scholars are less willing than is Zimring to encourage 
the support of legal policy for parental authority. They recognize the need 
for family autonomy, but their commitment to the egalitarian tradition 
leaves them uncomfortable with the prospect of authoritarian interference 
with the lives of children - even from parents.22 Others join Zimring in 
more forthrightly recognizing parental authority, both because legally sup-
ported parental autonomy serves the developmental needs of children and 
because the parental interest in childrearing has its own independent consti-
tutional protection.23 An additional factor of some magnitude is that if the 
"ultimate authority" of parents is not recognized, "they will be less willing 
22. See, e.g., Teitelbaum & Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children: JJue Process Rights and 
Their Application, 12 FAM. L.Q. 153, 166-74 (1978). Additional sources are discussed in 
Hafen, supra note 4, at 653-56. 
23. See, e.g., Goldstein, Medical Care far the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Pa-
rental Authority, 86 YALE LJ. 645, 648-49 (1977). 
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to assume responsibility for the child."24 
III. SUMMARY OF THEMES 
The foregoing attempt to locate Professor Zimring's position within the 
children's rights literature has served the additional purpose of introducing 
some of the major themes of The Changing Legal World of Adolescence. It 
is appropriate now to summarize the book's themes from its author's own 
perspective. The heading for Part I is, "What's going on here?" In these 
introductory chapters, Zimring illustrates the confusion that abounds in the 
regulation of adolescent behavior. For instance, some states have lowered 
the minimum drinking age to 18 to correspond with the reduced voting age, 
only to find themselves raising the drinking age after a few years of experi-
ence. In a similar search for consistency, California reduced the maximum 
age for allowable child support to 18, even though the vastly increased 
number of young men and women attending college has effectively pro-
longed their need for support. He also suggests the problems of an elusive 
consistency in constitutional case law by asking whether the right to obtain 
contraceptives25 is really the same as the right to challenge a curfew 
ordinance. 
Zimring rejects the notion of earlier maturing as well as the notion of 
children's liberation as explanations for the current situation: "American 
youth have not achieved an across-the-board precociousness that could ex-
plain an all-encompassing downward shift" for the age of adult status (p. 
22). The real explanation for recent legal changes, with all the accompany-
ing uncertainty, is that the law is finally catching up with the historical 
sweep of massive social change.26 
In Part II, "Deregulating Adolescence," Zimring suggests several possi-
ble explanations for the recent trend of reducing state control over adoles-
cent behavior. I have some difficulty in these chapters (and subsequent 
ones) knowing just how much he intends to be descriptive and how much is 
prescriptive. He claims at several points to be describing recent changes in 
the law, but some of what he says rejects certain dominant legal approaches 
and much of what he says introduces insightful concepts not ordinarily rec-
ognized by judges, legislators, or others in policymaking roles. In this Part, 
for instance, he introduces his "rebuttable presumption of liberty," which I 
discussed earlier.27 In applying this notion briefly to the public school con-
text, he is less willing to extend a presumptive form of "in loco parentis" 
parental liberty to the authority of schools. This is partly because families 
are really not "free to choose among alternative schools" (p. 58), and partly 
because some rationale other than arbitrary authority should exist to justify 
school policies. Zimring makes no serious attempt to summarize or even to 
illustrate recent developments in public school law, but his instincts are 
roughly consistent with prevailing judicial assumptions that give school ad-
ministrators considerable leeway so long as they act reasonably. 
24. Wald, supra note 9, at 277; accord, Hafen, supra note 4, at 655-56. 
25. See text accompanying note 11 supra. 
26. See text accompanying note I supra. 
27. See Section II.B.3 supra. 
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Zimring says his view that students should be free to choose about most 
relatively harmless school-related matters "should not be confused with 
treating children like adults. It is both more liberal and more accurate to 
suggest that it is treating children like people" (p. 59). From what he says 
elsewhere, I take this to be a statement of support for the view that adoles-
cence should be treated as its own recognizable legal category without nec-
essarily implicating either the concept of minority status or constitutional 
rights. Except for a brief chapter on procedural due process, the book never 
addresses in a comprehensive sense the large subject of constitutional rights 
for children - or adolescents. In the school context, Zimring does suggest 
that "[t]here is no reason why the Fourteenth Amendment, a notoriously 
blunt instrument, need be used as a basis for deciding issues relating to run-
of-the-mill dress codes" (p. 57). His brief references to constitutional issues 
in the abortion and contraceptive cases hint that he is similarly unimpressed 
there with the use of constitutional doctrines in such cases, since the real 
issues are, if anything, obscured by heavy civil rights jargon. In one sense, I 
find this relative disinterest in "constitutional rights" very refreshing, be-
cause it permits him to move quickly into an empirical analysis of real costs 
and benefits in each circumstance while bypassing the ponderous and mys-
tifyingly vague abstractions that often cloud the analytical picture of the 
case law. On the other hand, the reality is that constitutional lingo increas-
ingly fills the literature and the cases. Zimring would render a needed serv-
ice if he could offer some analytical tools that would help others to employ 
the methodology of his kind of legal realism while still dealing with - or 
satisfactorily explaining away - the constitutional artillery that is bogged 
down all over the current intellectual battlefield. 
One example of Zimringesque analysis that is more fruitful than typical 
constitutional analysis is his treatment of the Carey case28 in Chapter Five, 
Part Two. Here Zimring introduces his "least harm" test: regulatory policy 
is unacceptable if it does more harm than good. To Carey's question of 
when contraceptives should be available to adolescents, Zimring's answer is 
simple: 
Will limiting access to contraceptives successfully legislate universal teen-
age virginity? If not, the impact of limiting access to contraception in the 
name of youth welfare is fundamentally perverse. Rates of sexual activity 
may not be substantially affected, but the risk of unwanted pregnancy and 
the rate of venereal disease will increase. [Pp. 62-63.] 
In other words, if the evidence shows that prohibiting access to contracep-
tives does more harm than good, access should not be prohibited. There is 
a big empirical variable in that proposition, of course, and I would expect 
Zimring's bias toward research ~ata to make him eager to verify - when-
ever possible - such important factual issues as whether the availability of 
contraceptives is in fact unrelated to rates of sexual activity. Unfortunately, 
the Supreme Court did not have such a simple experience with Carey, in 
part because of the absence of empirical data and in part because of the 
ambiguous but emotional implications of basing the finding of unconstitu-
tionality on the right of privacy. Zimring's least harm approach would re-
duce the confusion the Court experienced - it would also reduce the 
28. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. 
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likelihood that lower courts would make a "choice right" precedent out of 
the case, when in fact it is a "protection right" case.29 
The least harm argument also clarifies the analysis of when parental 
consent should be required for medical care. Zimring summarizes a variety 
of state laws recently enacted for the purpose of encouraging urgently 
needed care for adolescents who might avoid seeking treatment if they were 
first required to disclose their problems to parents in obtaining consent. 
Typical cases involved venereal disease, drug abuse, or complications in 
pregnancy. In these cases, parental consent requirements may well do more 
harm than good. That is not the case with something like parental notifica-
tion as a condition of dispensing contraceptives, observes Zimring, because 
no harm has in fact occurred. "[I]t is still a time of decision-making about 
the future when parent-child interaction might be helpful" (p. 65). Thus, 
the least harm approach would not warrant generalizing from special-case 
categories to a more general right of medical care without parental consent. 
Again one sees in this context that Zimring's premises are more interested 
in helping adolescents than in simply "liberating" them without regard to 
what helps them most. 
Zimring also applies the least harm analysis to status offenders - ado-
lescents made subject to juvenile court jurisdiction through acts that would 
not be legal violations if committed by adults. Typical examples are run-
aways and truants. Status offense jurisdiction has recently been the subject 
of lively debate, as illustrated by the American Bar Association's rejection 
by a close vote of the proposal from the Juvenile Justice Standards Project 
that status offense violations should not subject juveniles to incarceration or 
other coercive measures.30 Some would eliminate coercive status offense 
sanctions on the theory that adolescents should simply be treated as adults 
- "liberated." Others would eliminate the sanctions because they mistrust 
state coercion generally. Zimring's is a more balanced view, focusing pri-
marily on the serious harm that can be inflicted through the particular en-
forcement methods employed with status offenders. Thus his search is for 
"cures .... that are not manifestly worse than the disease," but which also 
respond to "the dangers that the immature runaway or truant can inflict on 
him- or herself' (p. 72). Zimring separates the issue of enforcement from 
the issue of whether substantive regulation of any kind is warranted, not 
only with teenage sexual activity and status offenses, but in other contexts. 
His approach is constructive, not only because it allows for more careful 
analysis of regulatory costs and benefits, but also because it tends to smoke 
out critics of regulation who "find themselves reasoning that punitive meas-
ures they would object to in any event won't work because they shouldn't 
work" (p. 143) (emphasis in original). 
Professor Zimring's overriding concern with helping - rather than 
either liberating or coercing - adolescents also shows up in his assessment 
of the Supreme Court's procedural due process cases. In general, he seems 
to welcome the use of due process concepts as a check on the excessive 
discretion allowed juvenile judges under the original concepts of the juve-
29. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra. 
30. (6 Current Developments] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2226-27 (1980) ("Noncriminal Misbe-
havior'' standard). 
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nile court system. Once again, however, the issue is not simply whether 
adolescents should be categorized as adults or as children, but whether par-
ticular "adult" versions of due process serve the actual interest of young 
offenders. Commenting on In re Winship ,3 1 in which the Court held that 
delinquency must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, Zimring faults the 
Court for not considering "whether adult-style procedural entitlements 
could inhibit the youth welfare mission of the court for children" (p. 80). A 
higher burden of proof could result in acquittal of those who may seriously 
need court assistance: "Acquitting a large number of delinquents is not a 
high price to pay only if we live in a world where convicting them is not in 
their own best interest" (p. 80). Yet his concern for what procedure most 
benefits an adolescent makes him more skeptical about the likely wisdom of 
institutional confinement initiated by parents, whose constitutional interests 
in directing their children may be in direct conflict with the liberty interest 
of a minor in avoiding unfair confinement. In Zimring's view, while Win-
ship too easily assumed the overtones of an adult role for adolescents in its 
factual context, Parham v. J.R 32 erred in the opposite direction by too eas-
ily assuming the dominance of the parental role. 
In Chapter 8 at the end of Part II, Zimring coins one of his most original 
and valuable phrases: "Adolescence as a Learner's Permit" (p. 89). As 
noted earlier,33 it is Zimring's conviction that adolescence is entitled to rec-
ognition as a special legal category for the express purpose (among others) 
of making the teens the learning years. That purpose requires both greater 
freedom than is appropriate for small children and less freedom than is 
appropriate for adults. Reasoning from these premises, he is quick to ac-
knowledge that the liberty to learn does not necessarily imply autonomy 
and full responsibility for all purposes. In considering, say, drivers' licens-
ing for teenagers, the first question is not "how old is old enough to . . . 
drive," but "how old is old enough to learn to drive; to start a process ... 
that ends at competence if we're lucky; to invest, taking transitional risks, 
hoping that the result will be the right kind of adult" (p. 93) ( emphasis 
added). This perspective actively seeks to increase through experiential 
learning the capacity of young men and women to exercise responsible au-
tonomy. Yet it does so with eyes wide open to the reality that, because of 
the developmental nature of adolescence in contemporary society, "[p]eer 
orientation, foolhardy attitudes toward risk, and the powerful combination 
of social immaturity and physical mobility make middle adolescence into a 
mine field" (p. 92). 
An important element of this perspective is Zimring's unwillingness to 
accept the superficial consistency of arguing that youth should have full 
adult responsibility for their lives at the same age when they may vote. 
Liberty for one purpose need not - indeed, should not - mean liberty for 
all purposes, since much of adolescent liberty should be designed to prepare 
31. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
32. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). In Parham, the Coun upheld procedures allowing the parent-
initiated commitment of children without an adversarial hearing so long as "informal, tradi-
tional medical investigative techniques" were followed as a check on parental discretion. 442 
U.S. at 607. 
33. See text following note 31 supra. 
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them gradually for more demanding (and more risky) forms of adult lib-
erty. Reflecting his experience in criminal law and criminology, Zimring 
thus rejects the "quid pro quo argument" that since 18-year-olds "can vote 
they should pay the full price for committing transgressions" (p. 95). Im-
plied in this assessment is the idea that the mistakes from which adolescents 
learn to become adults could easily be mistakes that break the law. Zimr-
ing reflects traditional juvenile court theory in seeing these mistakes as op-
portunities to hold youngsters accountable as part of a learning process, 
rather than as part of a punitive process.34 
Part III ("The Jurisprudence of Semi-Autonomy") and Part IV ("Notes 
Toward the Future") amount primarily to further development and illustra-
tion of themes earlier introduced. Zimring suggests, for instance, that 
policymakers must learn to use multiple variables in their evaluation of 
factual circumstances and their view of legal categories. This approach is 
modeled on the capacity of a calculator, as opposed to the "binary box" 
approach of typically rigid thinking about legal problems, which sees per-
sons either as adults or children - with little in between. He talks also 
about "phasing," which restates his learner's permit notion about gradual 
learning processes: the right to learn to drink should come well after the 
right to learn to drive, since mixing the two as experiments is even more 
disastrous than other mixtures of those two phenomena. 
With this as background, Zimring then phases the reader into one of his 
most concrete proposals: a two-tiered age of majority - 18 for some pur-
poses, 21 for others. Zimring would make 18 a "presumptive" age of ma-
jority for the exercise of most adult forms of autonomy. However, he 
would delay for three years the imposition of financial independence and 
adult criminal responsibility. He would also extend until age 21 such "enti-
tlements" as Job Corps or other "special opportunities the state might wish 
to provide only to those who have not yet reached adulthood" (p. 111). His 
reason for selecting age 18 is mostly historical reality. His reason for delay-
ing the "responsibility" incident of adulthood is "because I simply do not 
believe that it is correct to speak of the average 19- or 20-year-old as fully 
adult in the modem world" (p. 113). Zimring is not at his empirical or 
analytical best with that rationale. Actually, the book generally makes little 
attempt to support these age choices (or many of his other insights) with 
data from studies of adolescent development. Zimring also comes close to 
overlooking (he does finally catch it, but in a relatively uncertain fashion) 
the important problem that parents may not be too enthusiastic about re-
taining economic responsibility for their children during the three years af-
ter those children have been given a general grant of autonomy.35 
34. As noted by Mr. Justice White: 
Reprehensible acts by juveniles are not deemed the consequence of mature . . . choice 
but of environmental pressures (or lack of them) or of other forces beyond their control. 
Hence the state legislative judgment not to stigmatize the juvenile delinquent by branding 
him a criminal; his conduct is not deemed so blameworthy that punishment is required to 
deter him or others. 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551-52 (1971) (White, J., concurring). 
35. One cannot have the freedom to live how and as one chooses and still demand pa-
rental support; one may not deliberately enter into contracts and yet insist that they be 
voidable. . . . Policies that restrict parental prerogatives are likely to create noncommit-
tal parental attitudes. 
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Nevertheless, the two-tiered majority is a provocative notion, not so much 
because he is persuasive about his choice of years (those choices will always 
be somewhat arbitrary), but because this suggestion vividly supports his ba-
sic "learner's permit" concept. I also find it interesting that Zimring would 
choose ages as old as these, especially in a world where some writers would 
liberate all children as soon as they can toddle fast enough to walk out the 
front door. 
I am impressed that for all Zimring has said about legal realism and the 
use of multiple variables, he would still rely on age limits. He does not 
particularly defend the use of arbitrary age brackets as such, but his use of 
them puts him into a relatively traditional camp. The main alternatives 
seem to be either the elimination of age limits altogether or the use of sub-
jective, individual determinations of capacity. The extreme liberationist's 
willingness to reject all attempts to segregate youth on the basis of age or 
capacity makes no practical sense, simply because biological development 
so slowly yet so surely moves infants from incapacity toward capacity. 
Below some fixed point, they are all obviously incapable of autonomous 
action. Thus there is little choice but to fix some age or developmental 
event that marks an identifiable transition from presumed incapacity to pre-
sumed capacity. At the other extreme lies the seductive but equally imprac-
tical notion of subjective determinations. I have discussed elsewhere36 
some of the difficulties with this elusive search for ultimate individual fair-
ness. Yet the Supreme Court has adopted the notion of individual judicial 
hearings on the issue of "maturity" as a key element in its approach to 
whether unmarried minors may choose to have abortions without parental 
consent. That approach is based on a sandy foundation, both because the 
social sciences are so unable even to define "maturity" (let alone measure 
when it has been achieved), and because the process is so inherently subjec-
tive that it risks all the kinds of abuse of judicial discretion associated with 
the prevailing criticisms of the juvenile court system. There are good rea-
sons, then, for substantial reliance on objective age limits. 
Zimring goes beyond recommending age limits only, thereby taking 
maximum possible account of our ability to deal administratively with the 
problem of individual variation. Using driver's licensing as his example, he 
suggests a combination of age grading, competency testing, and administra-
tive discretion. A minimum age limit is required as a threshold test; beyond 
that, limited discretion is allowed in measuring driving ability only -
which is relatively easy to assess objectively. F~er controllable discre-
tion is introduced into the driving age situation by insurance rates, where 
incentives and liberty can be related to actual experience. In general, he 
would use competency testing either when a legal privilege creates a danger 
to the user and to others, or when the privilege is requested, such as with a 
professional license. The form of discretion he finds most valuable is pa-
rental discretion, which should increase flexibility to deal with individual 
variations. Parental consent alone is not a sufficient condition for allowing 
Hafen, Puberlj', Privacy, and Protection: The Risks of Children's Rights, 63 A.B.A. J. 1383, 1388 
(1977). 
36. See Hafen, supra note 20, at 484-90. 
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adolescent liberty, however, because "[t]he law must allow for stupid par-
ents as well as wise ones" (p. 132). Age-grading becomes most significant 
when the capacity to test competence is weak and the consequences of mis-
takes threaten the individual or others in the community with substantial 
harm. In such cases, minimum ages may also be necessary to insure that 
kids grow up a bit before they risk making the wrong kinds of mistakes. [P. 
132.] 
Professor Zimring then introduces a detailed analysis of the problem of 
teenage smoking which he uses to illustrate the application of this method. 
I find this example a shrewd one to make many of his general points, partly 
because there is sufficient empirical data available to allow a relatively reli-
able cost-benefit analysis. In addition, teenage smoking may at first blush 
seem like one of the least important cases that warrant paternalistic restric-
tions. But Zimring points to data showing that smoking among teens is a 
major public health problem, especially since so many adults (who now 
wish they could quit smoking and• cannot because of relative addiction) ac-
quired the habit before they were old enough to assess its long-term conse-
quences. To make an informed choice about deciding to smoke requires a 
"sense of the long-term future not characteristically found in early and mid-
dle adolescence" (p. 138). Thus, attempts to deter teenage SJlloking by 
showing its health dangers have been ineffective, while attempts to show 
that smoking is not "cool" have done much better (p. 139). The smoking 
problem also allows Zimring to show how the extent of peer pressure 
among adolescents makes such behavior as smoking socially contagious. 
For policymakers, it is not simply a matter ofletting an adolescent make his 
own choice as an individual, victimless act: "To limit liberty as a defense 
against social contagion is to see the adolescent as part of a group having 
collective 'best interests' ... " (p. 140) (emphasis in original). Zimring then 
launches into a very detailed analysis of costs, benefits, and enforcement 
alternatives that allows him to apply his earlier themes about liberty pre-
sumptions, least harm, and a focus on which regulatory practices really 
maximize the chance of helping adolescents learn to make wise choices in 
general. He ends up concluding that no constitutional issues are involved; 
that a smoking lounge in a high school is a close cost-benefit question, but 
on balance may be more harmful than beneficial; and that he would proba-
bly settle for prohibiting teenage smoking at schools (but not at detention 
centers, where kids have enough trouble), if the penalty could be a tempo-
rary loss of privileges rather than expulsion. He is realistic in assuming that 
all smoking could not be stopped by this practice, but thinks some enforce-
ment effort would still reduce the ultimate extent of the problem.37 
In his concluding chapter, "In Praise of Muddling Through," Zimring 
defends the value of such "empirical guesses, talmudic distinctions, and an-
alytic pretensions" (p. 155) as he used in the smoking example - especially 
as an alternative to deciding all questions by the extreme of arbitrary, au-
37. Zimring's judgment received some vindication recently at a Tennessee high school 
where skeptics were surprised at the effectiveness of what is acknowledged to be an unenforce• 
able new state law against smoking by people under 18. ''The students' smoking areas of 
yesteryear are gone, and although they may be lighting up as soon as they leave school prop• 
erty, they are not doing so in school. . . . The threat alone [of enforcement] seems to have 
had a 'chilling effect.'" Eouc. WEEK, June 16, 1982, at 3. 
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thoritarian impositions or by the extreme of deciding that "children" should 
be free to do nothing and "adults" should be free to do everything. Neither 
approach serves the long-range interests of adolescents in learning to func-
tion as responsible adults. "[B]eating [such issues] to death" also produces 
"insight about the real reasons we make the choices we do. We will be less 
likely to take a least harm result, such as smokers' privileges in a detention 
facility or vaginal foam for the sexually active young, and extrapolate it to 
general grants of autonomy" (p. 157). In all this, it is crucial that policy-
makers "confront the real world," so that "[w]ith the best intentions," we do 
not "pass laws that miss the mark because they do not confront reality" (p. 
158). It has been far too easy, as Zimring makes clear, for lawmakers of 
either permissive or coercive persuasions to create what is essentially a hy-
pothetical world and then make laws inconsistent with the real world. 
When this is done, the "results are tidy, and the need for research minimal, 
but this process is either an amusement - a form of jurisprudential chess 
- or an exercise in self-deception. . . . To depart the planet we live on 
when making public policy endangers our children and ourselves" (pp. 159-
60). And finally: 
We cannot solve these problems by legislating adulthood at earlier ages or 
withdrawing public support for adolescent development. We must come to 
understand the central importance of a long maturing period for modem 
liberal democracy. Sustained efforts to improve the transition to adulthood 
will prove frustrating, expensive - and indispensable - to larger social 
progress. [P. 160.] 
IV. CONCLUSION 
My attempts to place Professor Zimring's writing into the context of 
contemporary work on children's rights and my attempt to summarize what 
he has to say have included what I hope is a clear~y discernible appreciation 
for his book. Overall, I consider it a significant contribution to the litera-
ture. I think his point of view, his approach, and his insights can be truly 
helpful in creating a practical legal order for the benefit of adolescents. It is 
heartening to read the work of someone who combines common sense with 
analytical skill and - as a result - does not get all bogged down in the 
hangups of those who take such adamant and unworkable positions as the 
extreme child savers or the extreme children's liberationists. He is particu-
larly helpful in explaining how either more firm regulation or more willing 
deregulation of adolescent liberty can - depending on the circumstances 
- serve the overriding purpose of preparing the young for responsible 
adulthood while minimizing serious damage to them. Thus, regulation can 
protect adolescents even as it restricts them as a way to help them learn by 
their own experience as their normal developmental processes unfold. The 
existing literature has focused far too little on adolescence as the learning 
years.38 As today's scholarly writing in this field goes, he also takes an 
38. My own view is that "[c]hildhood, as a time of life and as a frame of mind, is intimately 
related to educational development." Hafen, supra note 4, at 658. A notable instance of atten-
tion to the theme of educational development in considering children's rights is the work of 
John Garvey. Garvey has argued for instance, that first amendment rights as developed for 
children must be understood differently from first amendment rights for adults primarily be-
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unusual but clear cut stand in favor of state support for parental authority 
- again because that support will serve the interests of the young in ulti-
mately becoming responsible, liberated adults. 
I do have some concerns about The Changing Legal World of Adoles-
cence. I was surprised not to find much reliance on empirical data - par-
ticularly from fields in the social sciences dealing with the characteristics 
and needs of adolescent development. Zimring is no stranger to the use of 
such data - if anything, he has been criticized on other occasions for mak-
ing too much of social science research in his work on criminal law.39 
Michael Wald has provided a summary of child development literature in 
the context of children's rights40 suggesting strong justification for the con-
clusion that children under age 10-12 "do lack the cognitive abilities and 
judgmental skills necessary to make decisions about major events which 
could severely affect their lives."41 However, Wald also found that the re-
search regarding older children is more limited and therefore less conclu-
sive. As sensible as I find Zimring's assertion that adolescents through age 
18 generally lack some fundamental forms of capacity, we need to know 
whether available research data support or undermine his point of view. 
His entire argument rests largely on factual premises regarding the develop-
mental process. If the literature is simply inconclusive, as Wald intimates it 
might be, that problem should be faced. Such ambiguity could perhaps be 
addressed in terms of weighing the risks inherent in each alternative as-
sumption or interpretation. On that basis, Zimring's point of view is still 
defensible, since the risk of a temporary restriction on liberty (based on the 
assumption that further development is needed) is of less gravity than the 
risk of incurring permanent, substantial harm by being forced to assume 
adult responsibilities and make irrevocable choices too early. 
I also had difficulty throughout the book trying to keep straight how 
Zimring really feels about deferring to an adolescent's preferences for au-
tonomous choice. In general, his "learner's permit" notion and his several 
clear rejections of general liberation for children (including adolescents) 
made me feel comfortable in interpreting him as I have. However, he is at 
times confusing in referring to such basic concepts as his "rebuttable pre-
sumption of liberty." That presumption is usually stated in terms of family 
autonomy or even as a parental choice. At other times, however, he seems 
to imply that direct state regulation of adolescents (when parents are not 
directly involved) is also presumptively invalid - and yet from the overall 
context of the book, I am not sure he really means that. My uncertainty 
may be resolved by noting that he does not intend his "presumption" to be 
stated in the form of a constitutional preference. In his smoking example, 
cause the children's version "serves the function of advancing the child's growth into an adult 
capable of participating in self-government and in the quest for knowledge and truth." Gar-
vey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 321, 344-45 (1979). Garvey's work, 
like Zimring's, suggests that there is value in determining what policies are most likely to 
maximize sound educational development. Such determinations are a critical test for evaluat-
ing proposed rights and restrictions for adolescents in a variety of settings. 
39. See, e.g., Lindgren, Book Review, 94 HARV. L. REV. 477 (1980) (reviewing F. ZIMRINO 
& R. FRASE, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1980)). 
40. Wald, supra note 9, at 274-75. 
41. Id. at 274. 
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for instance, he simply asks whether there "is any good reason not to dele-
gate to 13-, 14-, and 15-year-olds the legal authority to decide whether, 
when, and how much to smoke" (p. 138). (I note, by the way, that the view 
of parents was not an issue in his discussion on smoking - which left me 
uncertain about the application of "parental liberty" in so many cases of 
direct state regulation.) Parents aside, he rather quickly identifies several 
reasons why smoking could be regulated. But it is hard to say whether 
these reasons would rise to the level of a "significant state interest," which 
was the test stated for justifying state intrusions on adolescent "privacy" in 
the Supreme Court's contraceptives case.42 That same test was later ap-
plied in a Fifth Circuit case dealing with an ordinance regulating access to 
coin-operated games when a parent or guardian was not present.43 
While I share Zimring's lack of interest in turning all adolescent regula-
tion cases into constitutional debates,44 his book would have been much 
more clear (and, therefore, more helpful) had it related his definition of 
"presumption" to the kind used in current constitutional analysis. Without 
his having done that, I foresee some risk that he could be cited as authority 
for the proposition that direct state regulation of adolescent choices is pre-
sumptively invalid in the constitutional sense. I doubt that Zimring would 
accept that assumption, in part because it severely shifts the burden of proof 
to those who would justify the regulation and also because it necessarily 
assumes that the children who are the subjects of regulation have presump-
tive capacity to act autonomously. Given the empirical doubts on that 
question, but the likelihood that most adolescents do not have sufficient 
capacity to benefit from general elimination of regulation, constitutional 
presumptions make it extremely difficult to engage in the balanced, careful 
kind of analysis Zimring advocates and illustrates. I suppose, then, that he 
would tell us to leave constitutional presumptions aside, but he does not tell 
us why and how to do that. 
For example, he asks early in the book whether the Carey precedent 
should justify striking down such regulations as curfews. He later con-
cludes that curfews are different from contraceptive regulation because they 
protect the community, the youth themselves, and they give parents needed 
reinforcement for their own authority (p. 68). He notes also that unless 
curfews are enforced in ways that do more harm than good, they are not 
covered by the Carey "least harm" concept. I agree with that interpreta-
tion, but only because Zimring and I see Carey as a least harm case. With 
the Court having seen it - at least rhetorically - as a "privacy" case, 
Zimring needs to help other courts see how to deal with that lofty term so 
they can examine actual costs and benefits through least harm analysis. I 
regard this as a serious problem primarily because constitutional language 
has become so prominent in children's rights litigation.45 
The book would also be stronger if the development of its main themes 
42. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int., 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
43. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980). 
44. This is especially the case with "the right of privacy," which I believe the Supreme 
Court has given a much narrower constitutional base - even in cases involving adults - than 
some co=entators and lower courts have realized. See Hafen, supra note 20, at 511-26. 
45. See text accompanying note 11 & Section II.B.3 supra. 
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were better organized. The themes are very strong ones, rich in insight and 
practical guidance. But one needs to read the entire book and piece things 
back together in order to bring a strong organizational framework into 
view. On my first reading, I began getting a little lost in the second half of 
the book, because the most interesting themes had already been introduced 
and given considerable comment. But the second half often trailed off into 
microscopic discussions and restatements of ea!lier ideas that gave the over-
all development less punch. The development also does not really respond 
to the main headings of the four parts. The detailed illustration on smok-
ing, for instance, valuable as it is, does not rise to the general level of 
"speculat[ing] about the future course of adolescence in public law" (p. xiv), 
as is billed in the preface. I felt a similar difficulty, though it may have been 
as much a matter of style and approach as a matter of organization, trying 
to follow when he was being prescriptive and when descriptive of present 
law.46 I finally gave up on that, and simply accepted the work as an inter-
esting set of prescriptive suggestions that draw their strength from a good 
deal of currently successful practice - even though current practices may 
not use the same terms and not all current practice is adequately repre-
sented. One need not be comprehensive to make a good set of suggestions 
• in which selective current practice is essentially illustrative. 
Zimring's suggestion of a two-tiered age of majority came as a mild bolt 
from the blue during my first reading. But by then he was not defending 
his suggestions with quite as much development or documentation. Also, 
by then I had begun enjoying the book mostly as a "think piece" containing 
a number of stimulating ideas being thrown on the table of the faculty 
lounge, not as fully developed arguments but as points of departure. The 
lecture format makes such an approach almost necessary, and the approach 
has its strengths as well as its limitations. 
Given those limitations, along with the brevity and the deliberately in-
formal style, it is remarkable that Frank Zimring is able to toss out so many 
interesting and understandable ideas across the complete range of what has 
now become a complex and important set of legal and social problems. 
This is not a definitive scholarly work, but as good fodder for further think-
ing, based on a perspective that is sound and thoughtful; it is a worthwhile 
piece of work. 
46. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra. 
